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 2 
Introduction
1
 
 
Apart from the flurry of interest immediately following the publication of the Abu Ghraib 
photographs in early 2004, the American media, political establishment, and wider public 
have thus far exhibited a deep reticence to confront the so-called „torture scandal‟ as an 
issue for sustained political debate.
2
 This is not at all surprising, given that instances of 
torture
3
 by service personnel profoundly challenges deeply-embedded cultural-political 
beliefs about American civic identity, the military, and the nature of the American polity. 
In fact, the public record demonstrates that the torture and abuse of prisoners in the war 
on terrorism has been far more extensive than official investigations and media reports 
would suggest, and has been taking place since the war on terrorism began in late 2001 
(see below). The public-political failure to accept the occurrence of systematic long-
running torture in US-run facilities may explain why so little attention has so far been 
given to the deeper explanations of how a climate of torture is created and sustained; 
blaming the torture on a few ill-disciplined and „un-American‟ „bad apples‟ instead has 
obvious political, legal, and cultural advantages. In particular, there has been a dearth of 
research into the role of public political discourse in constructing and sustaining the 
conditions necessary for the acceptance and normalization of torture across the military 
and wider society.
4
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which the political language 
of senior public officials regarding the terrorist threat facing America is implicated in the 
formulation of the torture policy, and the actual torture and abuse of prisoners. The 
central argument is simple: the discourse of the war on terrorism set the logic and 
possibilities of policy formulation in the first instance, and helped to create the wider 
legitimacy and social consensus that is required to enact policy. Importantly, there is a 
                                                 
1
 This study extends the research presented in my most recent book: Richard Jackson, Writing the War on 
Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005). 
2
 A CBS poll showed that 57 percent of Americans did not want any more abuse pictures to be released, 
and 49 percent said the media had spent too much time on the story (compared to just 6 percent who 
thought it had been under-covered). Poll quoted in Lila Rajiva, The Language of Empire: Abu Ghraib and 
the American Media (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2005), p. 68. Rajiva examines the media response 
to the scandal and concludes that it was reluctant to give it wider coverage, in large part because it simply 
found the allegations to be „too unbelievable‟ (p. 162). Similarly, Karen Greenberg argues that „very few 
Americans are eager to engage in a debate about the revival of torture in their name‟ and that „the public 
response has remained at best apathetic‟. Karen Greeberg, „Introduction: The Rule of Law Finds its Golem: 
Judicial Torture Then and Now‟, in Karen Greenberg, ed., The Torture Debate in America (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 1. 
3
 In this paper, I adopt the definition of torture contained in the United Nations Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Torture is defined as „any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.‟ Available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm.  
4
 Ronald Crelinsten provides a powerful exception, although his paper does not focus on specifically on the 
„torture society‟ created in the war on terrorism. See Ronald Crelinsten, „The World of Torture: A 
Constructed Reality‟, Theoretical Criminology, vol. 7, no. 3 (2003), pp. 293-318. 
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growing consensus that the current discourse and practice of torture and abuse by 
American service personnel is proving damaging to the wider international human rights 
framework and to human rights standards in other countries. 
The paper is divided into three main sections. In the first section, I summarize 
what is known about the extent of torture and prisoner abuse, as well as the nature of 
official complicity in those abuses. The second section provides an overview of several 
individual, social-psychological, and historical factors that are vital to understanding the 
occurrence of torture and prisoner abuse in this and other contexts. The third and most 
important section explores the role of public political discourse as a key explanatory 
factor in the deliberate construction of the torture policy, as well as its role in creating 
military and public acceptance for such treatment. In the conclusion, I discuss the 
implications of torture on the wider human rights context, as well as some of the broader 
ontological and normative implications of the paper‟s central findings. 
 
What is Known about Torture in the War on Terrorism  
 
The extensive public record relating to „the torture scandal‟ suggests two broad 
conclusions: first, the torture and abuse of prisoners has been a long-running and central 
strategy of the war on terrorism; and second, despite frequent public denials, senior 
officials were highly complicit in constructing the torture policy from the very beginning. 
 
The Extent of Torture and Prisoner Abuse 
 
The ever-increasing wealth of public information on the prisoner abuse scandal clearly 
demonstrates that the use of torture and cruel and inhumane treatment against prisoners 
by American forces has been both widespread and systematic.
5
 In the first instance, the 
public record confirms that officials and human rights organizations first began to raise 
their concerns about the treatment of terrorist suspects swept up after the September 11, 
2001 attacks, as well as the treatment of captives during Operation Enduring Freedom, in 
late 2002 – nearly two years before the Abu Ghraib photographs were first published.6 In 
other words, allegations of torture and abuse of prisoners have been reported for more 
than three years, since the early days of the war on terrorism.  
The extent of the torture and abuse is revealed in official military investigations 
which have recorded around 300 official allegations of abusive behaviour towards 
detainees in more than twenty US-run detention centers up to August 2004.
7
 The ICRC 
                                                 
5
 Published documentation of the extent of torture and abuse in the war on terrorism can be found in the 
following sources, among others: Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on 
Terror (New York: New York Review of Books, 2004); Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel, editors, The 
Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David 
Rose, Guantánamo: America’s War on Human Rights (London: Faber and Faber, 2004); Seymour Hersh, 
Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (London: Penguin, 2004); David Cole, Enemy 
Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism (New York: The New 
Press, 2003); Rachel Meerpol, editor, America’s Disappeared: Secret Imprisonment, Detainees, and the 
“War on Terror” (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005); Lila Rajiva, The Language of Empire: Abu 
Ghraib and the American Media (New York: Monthly Review Press). 
6
 Human Rights Watch, for example, wrote to President Bush with their concerns in December 2002. See 
Rajiva, The Language of Empire, p. 47. 
7
 See „The Schlesinger Report‟, August 2004, in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, p. 909. 
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made over 200 allegations of ill-treatment of prisoners of war in May 2003; they made 
another fifty allegations regarding ill-treatment at Camp Cropper alone in July 2003.
8
 
And human rights researchers have tracked more than 330 accusations of abuse against 
more than 460 detainees since 2001, involving more than 600 U.S. military and civilian 
personnel.
9
 The catalogue of abuse revealed in these and other reports has been 
corroborated in a number of subsequent legal trials, as well as in the more than 1,800 
photographs and nearly 100 videos of prisoner abuse now held by army investigators.
10
  
Importantly, allegations of human rights abuses have not been confined to 
American forces; British, Danish, Iraqi, and Afghan forces have also been accused of 
abusing detainees and a number of British and Danish soldiers have since gone on trial 
for serious crimes against prisoners. Journalistic and legal investigations, backed up by 
photos, videos, and prisoner testimonies, further corroborate the official and non-
governmental findings,
11
 but also reveal a great many other instances of abusive 
behaviour and human rights violations unacknowledged by administration officials or 
purportedly still under official investigation. For example, information gathered by 
journalists and lawyers – and now the subject of intense public debate among European 
politicians worried about the extent of European involvement in the practice – suggests 
that an estimated 100-150 terrorist suspects have been secretly transported by the CIA on 
private jets to countries where legal and ethical restraints on torture are routinely flouted, 
such as Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Syria.
12
 Frequently, under the direction of American 
(and sometimes British) intelligence agents, prisoners have suffered months of severe 
torture followed in some cases by execution or disappearance. This is the long-running
13
 
and strictly illegal practice by American intelligence of torture by proxy, euphemistically 
termed „extraordinary rendition‟. The case of Maher Arar, a Syrian-born Canadian 
engineer, is instructive: arrested up while in transit through New York, Arar was secretly 
transported to Syria via Italy and Jordan where he was subjected to sustained torture for a 
                                                 
8
 Reed Brody, „The Road to Abu Ghraib‟ in Meerpol, America’s Disappeared, p. 123. 
9
 „Report: Detainee abuse claims not investigated in full‟, CNN.com, April 26, 2006, URL: 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/04/26/detainee.report/index.html. 
10
 Rajiva, The Language of Empire, p. 54. 
11
 See for example, „One Year After the Abu Ghraib Torture Photos: U.S. Government Response “Grossly 
Inadequate”‟, Human Rights First, April 26, 2005, available online at: 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/statements/abu-yr-042605.htm, accessed July 11, 2005; David 
Rose, Guantánamo: America’s War on Human Rights, (London, 2004); Seymour Hersh, Chain of 
Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (London, 2004); David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double 
Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism, (New York, 2003); Rajiva, The 
Language of Empire; Meerpol, America’s Disappeared – among others. 
12
 This figure is documented by Human Rights First, who also claim that there have been at least 11 secret 
detention locations used since September 11. Human Rights First, End Torture Now Campaign, „Torture: 
Quick Facts‟, available online at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/misc/factsheet.htm, accessed 
3 March, 2006. 
13
 In testimony to the 9/11 Commission, George Tenet, then director of the CIA, stated that in an 
unspecified period before September 11, 2001, America had undertaken more than 70 such renditions. See 
Steven Watt, „Torture, “Stress and Duress,” and Rendition as Counter-Terrorism Tools‟ in Meerpol, 
America’s Disappeared. 
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year, until Syrian officials concluded that he was innocent of any involvement in 
terrorism and released him.
14
 
If we assume that the officially reported and documented abuses represent only a 
small proportion of the total cases, as criminologists argue in regards to the statistics on 
rape and child abuse for example, then it seems reasonable to suggest that torture has 
been far more widely practiced than administration officials are willing to admit.
15
 This is 
the conclusion of an American Bar Association report which stated that „The American 
public still has not been adequately informed of the extent to which prisoners have been 
abused, tortured, or rendered to foreign governments which are known to abuse and 
torture prisoners.‟16 In a similar vein, the Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project 
concluded: „It has become clear that the problem of torture and other abuse by U.S. 
personnel abroad was far more pervasive than the Abu Ghraib photos revealed – 
extending to numerous U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and at Guantanamo 
Bay, and including hundreds of incidents of abuse.‟17 In short, there is an emerging 
consensus among some commentators that „torture has become a core tactic in the war on 
terror‟.18 
Disturbingly, a number of public officials and media commentators in America 
have suggested that the publicly exposed abuse of prisoners falls far short of what the 
legal and public understanding of „torture‟ entails, and that at most it constitutes „torture 
lite‟ or isolated instances of degrading and abusive treatment.19 Such a position is 
untenable however, given the types of violent assault prisoners have been subjected to: 
casual and serious beatings which in some cases resulted in death, including with a 
broomstick and pistol-whipping; the insertion of lighted cigarettes into prisoner‟s ears; 
prolonged hooding; transportation in unventilated boxes and in painful restraints; sleep 
deprivation; sensory deprivation by exposure to bright lights and loud music; threats of 
removal to countries where they are likely to face torture and death; prolonged restraint in 
so-called „stress‟ positions; being kept naked and bound for days at a time; prolonged 
solitary confinement; the deliberate and sustained use of electric shock equipment against 
prisoners, including on prisoners‟ genitals; the denial of medical treatment, including to a 
prisoner who had been shot; the pouring of phosphoric acid over prisoners‟ genitals; the 
unleashing of attack dogs on naked prisoners; pouring cold water on naked detainees; 
„water boarding‟ in which prisoners are forcibly submerged under water and made to 
believe they will drown; the sodomy of prisoners with chemical lights and broomsticks; 
rape and its threat; other forms of sexual humiliation and ritual domination; the 
                                                 
14
 The story of Maher Arar is detailed in Jane Mayer, „Outsourcing Torture‟, New Yorker, February 14, 
2005, available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/06/politics/06intel.html, accessed March 8, 
2005. 
15
 It is important to note that many of the official reports themselves, including the ICRC report, state that 
the abuses recorded are not meant to be exhaustive lists, but merely illustrative of the kinds of behaviour 
they discovered. 
16
 „American Bar Association Report to the House of Delegates‟, August 2004, in Greenberg and Dratel, 
The Torture Papers, p. 1134. 
17
 „Report: Detainee abuse claims not investigated in full‟, CNN.com. 
18
 Alex Belamy, 2006. „No Pain, No Gain? Torture and Ethics in the War on Terror‟, International Affairs, 
82(1): p. 147. 
19
 Donald Rumsfeld insisted that what the Abu Ghraib prisoners suffered was not „technically‟ torture, but 
only „abuse‟. Quoted in David Sussman, „What‟s Wrong with Torture?‟, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 
33, no.1 (2005), p. 1. 
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mutilation of corpses; and murder
20
 – among others.21 Such practices, particularly „water-
boarding‟, have been standard practice for the most notorious torture regimes for decades 
and cannot in any way be considered „torture lite‟. 
 
Official Complicity in Torture 
 
Based on the extensive public record, including the paper trail of policy and legal 
deliberations regarding the obstacles to employing more intensive forms of interrogation 
between the Pentagon, the white house, and the Justice Department, we now know that 
senior administration officials made a deliberate decision to employ torture as a counter-
terrorism strategy in late 2001. Journalistic investigations have revealed that in the 
immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, senior administration officials agreed that 
fighting al Qaeda would involve a no-holds-barred approach which could entail 
employing distasteful methods, such as employing foreign intelligence services to gain 
confessions by torture if necessary,
22
 or utilizing coercive and abusive interrogation 
techniques directly.
23
 Consequently, President Bush signed a top-secret finding in late 
2001 or early 2002 authorizing the Defense Department to set up a specially recruited 
clandestine team of operatives to snatch or assassinate „high value‟ al Qaeda operatives 
anywhere in the world who would then be interrogated secretly and in ways 
unconstrained by legal limits or public disclosure.
24
 This was the origin of the 
administration‟s rendition program, in which hundreds of terrorist suspects have so far 
been captured or kidnapped in dozens of different countries and transported to 
Guantánamo Bay or to third countries like Syria, Jordon, Egypt, and Singapore for 
interrogation. This initial authorization for a secret „dirty war‟ against terrorists was 
                                                 
20
 In a submission to the UN Committee Against Torture, Amnesty International stated: „It is known that at 
least 34 detainees who died in US Custody have had their deaths listed by the army as confirmed or 
suspected criminal homicides.‟ They go on to suggest that the true number may be much higher due to 
delays, cover-ups, and deficiencies in investigations. See Amnesty International, „USA: Amnesty 
International‟s Supplementary Briefing to the UN Committee Against Torture‟, AI Index: AMR 
51/061/2006, 3 May, 2006, available online at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr510612006, 
accessed 20 May, 2006. Human Rights First claim that 45 detainees have died in US custody due to 
suspected or confirmed criminal homicides, with at least 8 having been tortured to death. Human Rights 
First, „Torture: Quick Facts‟. 
21
 Examples of these kinds of abuses are documented in the following reports: „The Depositions: The 
Prisoners Speak, Sworn Statements by Abu Ghraib Detainees‟; „Report of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected 
Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation‟, February 2004; 
„The Taguba Report‟, March 2004; „The Mikolashek Report‟, July 2004; „The Schlesinger Report‟, August 
2004; „Vice Admiral Albert Church III‟s Brief on Investigation into Allegations of Abuse of Prisoners at 
Guantánamo Bay‟, May, 2004; and the „Fay/Jones Report‟, August 2004, in Danner, Torture and Truth and 
Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers. See also, Rajiva, The Language of Empire.  
22
 See Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Pocket Books, 2003), pp. 74-78. 
23
 See Hersh, Chain of Command, pp. 49-50. See also Mark Danner, „Abu Ghraib: The Hidden Story‟, The 
New York Review of Books, October 7, 2004, available online at: 
http://www.markdanner.com/nyreview/100704_abu.htm, accessed 3 April, 2006. 
24
 Ibid, p. 16. 
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quickly institutionalized as an „unacknowledged‟ special-access program (SAP) in the 
Defense Department known inside the intelligence community as „Copper Green.‟25  
The important point is that this secret global program in which interrogators were 
authorized to use methods that went beyond legal limits was later extended to Iraq and 
Afghanistan as a means of combating the growing insurgencies there. It was in this 
context that individual prison guards received instructions from intelligence operatives to 
„set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews‟26 – a euphemism for breaking the 
will of prisoners, or „softening them up‟. An official military investigation into prisoner 
abuse in Iraq acknowledged that „There was a perception among the guard personnel that 
this type of behavior by the interrogators was condoned by their chain of command.‟27 
Similarly, the Taguba Report concluded that „personnel assigned to the 372nd MP 
Company, 800
th
 MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to “set the 
conditions” for MI [Military Intelligence] interrogations.‟28 In other words, it seems 
likely it had already been decided at a senior level to extend the use of coercive and 
abusive interrogation methods – „any means necessary‟ in the language of the presidential 
finding – to all theatres of the war against terrorism, and prison guards were encouraged 
to assist the information-extraction process by using torture and cruel, inhumane, and 
degrading treatment to psychologically prepare the prisoners for questioning.  
Importantly, it can be easily demonstrated how such forms of abuse are carefully 
calculated for strategic reasons, rather than being random or pointless sadism. There is an 
extremely large literature detailing the strategic logic of employing torture and 
conspicuous human rights abuses in situations of asymmetric war
29
 – as a means of 
preventing civilian defection to the enemy, for example. More specifically, there is 
evidence that the sexual humiliation
30
 seen in the Abu Ghraib photographs was 
deliberately conceived as a culturally-specific method of breaking down the 
psychological resistance of Iraqi detainees; military and intelligence officials believed 
that Arabs were particularly vulnerable to sexual humiliation due to cultural 
conditioning.
31
 In addition to their role as trophies and the added humiliation for the 
                                                 
25
 Ibid, p. 46. See also, „USA: Amnesty International‟s Supplementary Briefing to the UN Committee 
Against Torture‟. 
26
 „The Ryder Report‟, quoted in Hersh, Chain of Command, p. 28. See also Rose, Guantanamo, pp. 87-8. 
27
 „The Mikolashek Report‟, July 2004, in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, p. 655. 
28
 „The Taguba Report‟, March 2004, in Danner, Torture and Truth, p. 294. 
29
 See among many others, Roger Beaumont, „Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions‟, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, vol. 541 (Small Wars), (1995), pp. 20-35; Stathis 
Kalyvas, „Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria‟, Rationality and Society, vol. 11, 
no.3 (1999), pp. 243-85; M. L. R. Smith, „Guerillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity 
Warfare‟, Review of International Studies, vol. 29 (2003), pp.19-37; Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rain 
Forest: War, Youth, and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 1996). 
30
 Humiliation, particularly a vast array of types of sexual humiliation, is common to torture the world over. 
In part, this is because „torture forces its victim into the position of colluding against himself (sic) through 
his own affects and emotions, so that he experiences himself as simultaneously powerless and yet actively 
complicit in his own violation. So construed, torture turns out to be not just an extreme form of cruelty, but 
the pre-eminent instance of a kind of forced self-betrayal, more akin to rape than other kinds of violence.‟ 
Sussman, „What‟s Wrong with Torture?‟, p. 4. 
31
 Various commentators note that senior administration officials were greatly influenced by The Arab 
Mind, a book on Arab culture and society published by Raphael Patai in 1973. The book includes a long 
chapter on Arab attitudes towards sex, concluding that sexual subjects are a cultural taboo invested with 
shame in Arab society. This academic „knowledge‟ was then used to fashion the sexual humiliation 
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detainees of being photographed, the evidence also suggests that photographing the 
abuses was itself a strategic decision: it was thought that some prisoners could be induced 
to spy on their associates to avoid dissemination of the shameful photographs to their 
friends and family.
32
 Similarly, the iconic image of the hooded man standing on a box 
with electrical wires attached to his hands was more than simply cruel theatre: keeping a 
person in this position for several hours functions as both a form of „sleep deprivation‟ 
and a „stress position‟.33 It seems likely therefore, that this particular case of torture was 
one of many creative, but ultimately banal, attempts by the prison guards to put into 
practice approved techniques for „setting the conditions‟ for military interrogation. 
 The argument that it was a deliberate and calculated policy is also buttressed by 
the evidence contained in the paper trail of the administration‟s internal debates over the 
legality of such practices.
34
 The internal memos between the Justice Department and the 
administration reveal that senior administration officials deliberately chose Guantánamo 
as a site for prisoner confinement and interrogation specifically because it was believed 
to afford a degree of legal protection from the reach of American and international 
courts.
35
 In addition, the Justice Department advice to the white house strongly indicates 
that the administration had already decided on the policy and was looking for legal 
justification, as well as legal protection, for employing methods that they knew went 
beyond national and international legal restrictions.
36
 Importantly, the official record also 
reveals that a number of senior white house officials, senior military officers, FBI agents, 
Pentagon advisors, and other intelligence operatives, cautioned against adopting such 
practices for a range of compelling reasons, including that it could undermine the legal 
protection of American troops in theatres of war.
37
 
 
Explanations for Torture 
 
A frequently heard explanation of the torture and abuse of prisoners in Iraq, particularly 
from administration officials, is that they were the actions of a very small group of ill-
disciplined individuals, who even if they had been instructed to „set the conditions‟ for 
prisoner interrogation, clearly went far beyond acceptable standards of military behavior. 
                                                                                                                                                 
strategies vividly portrayed in the Abu Graib photographs. See Hersh, Chain of Command, pp. 38-39. In 
addition, Lynndie England stated that the photos were taken deliberately for psy-op reasons. Quoted in 
Rajiva, The Language of Empire, p. 79.   
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Carter, „The Road to Abu Ghraib‟. 
34
 The construction of the legal defence of torture is analysed in some detail in: Anthony Lewis, 
„Introduction‟, in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers; David Luban, „Liberalism, Torture, and the 
Ticking Time Bomb‟, David Bowker, „Unwise Counsel: The War on Terrorism and the Criminal 
Mistreatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody‟, and Noah Feldman, „Ugly Americans‟, all in Greenberg, The 
Torture Debate in America. 
35
 According to a senior Pentagon official, Guantánamo Bay was chosen precisely because it was seen to 
have a low risk of litigation by virtue of its unique location and legal status. Rose, Guantánamo, p. 33. 
36
 As Anthony Lewis put it, administration lawyers „were asked how far interrogators could go in putting 
pressure on prisoners to talk without making themselves, the interrogators, liable for war crimes.‟ Lewis, 
„Introduction‟, in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, p. xiii. 
37
 See administration memoranda in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, pp. 122-33; Rose, 
Guantánamo, p. 95; Lewis, „Introduction‟, in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, p. xvi; Hersh, 
Chain of Command, pp. 6-7, 13-14, 42-43, 60-62; and Watt, „Torture, “Stress and Duress,”‟ in Meerpol, 
America’s Disappeared, p.76. 
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It is true that many of the guards at Abu Ghraib were poorly trained private security 
contractors and reservists, while others had poor work and discipline records. The 
Pentagon admitted in an internal report that many of its intelligence officers in 
Afghanistan had received little or no training.
38
 Similarly, military investigations into the 
abuses in Iraq identify poor training, along with weak leadership and oversight, as one of 
the key explanatory variables for the abuse of prisoners.
39
 Individual inexperience clearly 
does play a role in some instances of torture, especially when vetting processes of prison 
guards fail, training is inadequate, and supervision is lax. However, such a simplistic 
explanation cannot stand alone; the abuses were far too widespread, strategically 
conceived, and systematically administered to be the work of a few „bad apples‟. 
Another explanatory perspective on torture derives from social-psychology, 
particularly a number of experiments undertaken in the 1970s, as well as evidence from 
prisoner of war camps and military training simulations. Stanley Milgram for example, 
demonstrated how easy it was to persuade ordinary people to cause severe pain in others, 
especially when ordered to do so by an authority figure.
40
 The diffusion of responsibility 
through multiple and overlapping layers of authority can also contribute to such abuses 
by magnifying this effect. The Stanford Prison Experiment in 1971 by psychologist 
Philip Zimbardo found that when ordinary people are given absolute power over others 
they very quickly become sadistic and abusive towards their captives, particularly in the 
presence of weak supervision regimes and the toleration of minor abuses in the early 
stages. Military research in war resistance training similarly demonstrates that regardless 
of how good the training and oversight, some inappropriate behavior from guards will 
always occur in a prisoner situation.
41
 Related to this, a shortage of troops in Iraq led to 
chaotic and disorganized detainee operations and a very low ratio of military police to the 
number of inmates at Abu Ghraib.
42
 This situation created gaps in oversight, as well as 
stress in the under-staffed prison guards. In other words, the instructions given by 
authority figures in Iraq and elsewhere to „set the conditions‟ for interrogation, combined 
with the group dynamics of a stressful social situation in which prison guards had 
absolute control over the bodies of the inmates, likely reduced the behavioral constraints 
that might have prevented incidents of torture.  
It can also be argued that the brutalization of soldiers during training likely plays 
a key role in de-sensitizing soldiers to physical and psychological violence against 
detainees. That is, subject to de-personalization, uniforms, lack of privacy, lack of sleep, 
disorientation, punishing physical regimes, harsh and often capricious punishments, and 
violent hazing rituals, soldiers come to accept arbitrary and frequently sadistic violence 
                                                 
38
 Rose, Guantánamo, p. 45. 
39
 A report in July 2004 for example, found that many prison guards did not have training specific to 
detainee handling, and a great many individuals involved in interrogation were not school-trained as 
interrogators. See „The Mikolashek Report‟, July 21, 2004, in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, 
p. 656. 
40
 Discussed in Joanna Burke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth-Century 
Warfare (Great Britain: Basic Books, 1999), p. 185. 
41
 „The Mikolashek Report‟, July 2004, in Greenberg and Dratel, The Torture Papers, p. 653. 
42
 Phillip Carter, „The Road to Abu Ghraib‟, The Washington Monthly, November 2004, available online at: 
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as normal to military life.
43
 This is a crucial component of the training process which is 
necessary for transforming ordinary people into disciplined soldiers capable of killing on 
command; overcoming social and psychological inhibitions to committing violence 
against other human beings actually requires a carefully formulated and sustained 
training program over several months.
44
 It is more than a coincidence that many of the 
abuses recorded in Iraq mirror the treatment meted out to recruits as part of their training 
and initiation into military life. 
A related element is the ubiquitous and deliberate use of the September 11, 2001 
attacks as a source of motivation for American military personnel. The military have 
always employed propaganda about the grievous wrongs of the enemy to inspire and 
motivate its soldiers; during World War II for example, the attack on Pearl Harbor was 
deliberately used to instill hatred towards the Japanese among new recruits. In the war on 
terror, US military recruitment and training films frequently employ images of 9/11, and 
posters and monuments to the attacks abound at the American base in Guantánamo Bay,
45
 
among others. It seems likely that the constant reminders of the atrocities functions to 
sustain anger and hatred towards America‟s enemies, and to de-sensitize soldiers to the 
suffering of „terrorist‟ suspects. Considering the large numbers of Americans who 
continue to believe that Iraq was involved in the terrorist attacks,
46
 hatred and anger 
towards Iraqi detainees in particular, is unsurprising. 
Another explanatory perspective focuses on the historical continuities in 
American counter-insurgency practice, domestic prisoner management, and the treatment 
of immigrants. The argument here is that earlier practices in other arenas act as a 
discursive learning process, and that over time the language and practice of prisoner 
management has become embedded in institutional knowledge and practice, standard 
operating procedures, and collective memory and popular culture.  
In the first instance, the historical experience of American counter-insurgency 
demonstrates clear continuities in practice from the earliest colonial times. The Seminole 
wars in Florida for example, were characterized by classic dirty war tactics,
47
 as was the 
war against the Dakota Sioux in 1862. During this campaign hundreds of prisoners were 
declared „unlawful combatants‟ and subject to summary trial by military commission; 
some 38 were later executed.
48
 More generally, the management of captured and defeated 
Native Americans during counter-insurgency and resettlement operations reveals 
numerous continuities with the treatment of insurgents in Iraq today. Later, the period of 
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American colonial rule in the Philippines witnessed 117 verifiable atrocities against 
Filipino civilians between 1898 and 1902 – at the cost of thousands of lives.49 Similar 
practices characterized anti-communist counter-insurgency during the cold war. The 
Phoenix program in Vietnam for example, employed assassination and torture as a means 
of rooting out Viet Cong agents, leading to the deaths of some 25,000 suspected 
Vietcong.
50
  
The Church Commission in 1975, established by the Senate Committee on 
Intelligence, found that in addition to the abuses in Vietnam, the CIA had been involved 
in comparable activities in other parts of the world, notably Latin America.
51
 Counter-
insurgent interrogation approaches developed in Vietnam were subsequently exported to 
Latin America via the notorious School of the Americas (since renamed the Western 
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation). Training manuals from this period, 
notably the „KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual, July 1963‟, and its 
successor, the „Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual, 1983‟, detail very similar 
kinds of techniques to those currently employed in the war on terrorism.
52
 During 
America‟s first war against terrorism declared by Ronald Reagan, illegal rendition, 
torture, and murder were also employed against Middle East terrorist suspects.
53
 From a 
historical perspective then, the abuses in Iraq and elsewhere follow a long-established 
path in American counter-insurgency doctrine and practice. This is not to say that the 
American experience is in any way unique among Western states; systematic and 
widespread human rights abuses were regularly used against suspected insurgents during 
colonial counter-insurgency in the Congo, Namibia, Malaya, Cyprus, Kenya, Indochina, 
and most notoriously, Algeria,
54
 as well as during the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
Similarly, recent evidence has emerged showing extreme torture and abuse of suspected 
communists, Soviet agents, suspected Nazis, and members of the SS by British forces in 
special interrogation centres in Germany at the end of World War II.
55
 
 The abuses enacted against prisoners in Iraq also follow well-established and 
long-term practices in domestic approaches to prisoner management, particularly in 
American supermaximum or „supermax‟ prisons which are designed for the most 
dangerous felons. Amnesty International reports that more than 20,000 prisoners are 
currently held in more than 40 „supermax‟ prisons across America in conditions of long-
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term social isolation, extreme sensory deprivation, permanently lit cells, highly restricted 
exercise, severe forms of shackling, and harsh discipline.
56
 Journalistic investigations 
also reveal widespread and often systematic abuse of prisoners in the wider American 
penal system, with inhumane and dangerous forms of manacling, excessive use of 
chemical agents to punish and subdue prisoners, severe punishment regimes, shackling of 
pregnant women, ill-treatment of children and youth, and the like. It thus appears that 
many of the prisoner management practices developed in America‟s domestic prisons 
have been transferred to the operating practices of the war on terror.
57
 In fact, in many 
cases, prison guards in Iraq have had previous experience in the domestic penal system.
58
 
Lastly, the way that many immigrants have been treated by the authorities also 
reveals striking discursive continuities with the war on terror, particularly after the 
terrorist attacks when thousands were caught up in a general sweep by the authorities. 
Interestingly, prior to September 11, 2001, Guantánamo Bay was used as a detention 
center for Haitian and Cuban refugees; they too were held for extended lengths of time 
without access to lawyers or judicial processes, often in appalling conditions. As with the 
Camp Delta detainees, the site was chosen because it was considered to be beyond the 
reach of domestic courts.
59
 Official documents reveal that on any given day, over 20,000 
„immigration detainees‟ languish in American federal, state, county, and private prisons, 
often in deplorable and inhuman conditions similar to those reserved for „supermax‟ 
prisoners, and often without access to legal counsel.
60
 Moreover, according to an Office 
of the Inspector General (OIG) report in December 2003, post-9/11 immigration 
detainees have been the systematic and frequent victims of physical brutalities such as: 
slamming, bouncing, and ramming detainees against walls; bending detainees‟ arms, 
hands, wrists, and fingers; pulling and stepping on detainees‟ restraints to cause pain; the 
improper use of restraints; and rough and inappropriate handling.
61
 This is in addition to 
the psychological suffering induced by social isolation, indefinite detainment, lack of 
legal representation, and the like. 
Related to these historical experiences, American prisoner interrogation and 
management approaches have always employed a sanitized language that functions to 
obscure the physical and psychological effects of the material practices on the bodies of 
detainees. Just like the specialized military language of „collateral damage‟, „surgical 
strikes‟, and „daisy-cutters‟, the interrogator‟s euphemistic language of „counter-
resistance strategies‟, „stress and duress‟ techniques, „non-injurious physical contact‟, 
„stress positions‟, „forced grooming‟, „ego down techniques‟, „rendition‟, „legitimate 
force‟, and the like, functions to emotionally distance both the interrogator and the wider 
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public from the human pain and suffering involved in these practices, thereby facilitating 
the practice of torture.
62
 
 Therefore, from a broader historical and institutional perspective, the abuses in 
Iraq come as no surprise. Across all American security institutions, from the prison 
service to the immigration service, to the CIA and the military, the harsh and often brutal 
treatment of prisoners is no more than standard practice and not at all uncommon. In this 
sense, the discursive foundations for the abuses of the war on terrorism were firmly 
established long before the Abu Ghraib scandal broke; the abuse was reflexive of 
institutional language and culture. 
 
Political Language and the Construction of Torture 
 
A factor notable for its absence in most discussions of the causes of torture in the war on 
terrorism is the role of political language or discourse,
63
 particularly by leaders. In this 
section, I will attempt to argue that a focus on the discourse of policy elites is crucial for 
understanding the torture scandal for two main reasons: first, discourses set the logic and 
possibilities of policy formulation; and second, they create the wider legitimacy and 
social consensus that is required to enact policy – they permit the construction of a torture 
sustaining reality.
64
 We can observe both these processes in the war on terrorism. 
 
The Discourse-Policy Connection 
 
From a policy perspective, discourse consists of the language, texts, symbols, and 
narratives that policy actors use in their communication with each other, and with the 
public in their efforts to generate and legitimise a policy programme. Discourses provide 
the basis on which policy preferences, interests and goals are constructed. Narratives – 
the public stories that provide coherence and consistency to the scenes, characters, and 
themes that guide the moral conduct of a society, and that provide meaning to the lives of 
the community‟s members – are also central to the process of formulating policy. The 
important point is that discourses are never neutral or objective; rather they are always an 
exercise in social power – the power to ascribe right and wrong, reasonable and 
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unreasonable, knowledge and falsehood, and the limits of commonsense. They set the 
parameters of debate and establish the boundaries for possible action. In this case, the 
torture policies that administration officials formulated and sanctioned emerged directly 
from the core narratives at the heart of the war on terrorism. It is important to note that I 
am not saying that interests were not central to the formulation of the torture policy; 
clearly, there was an overwhelming interest in gaining information that could be used to 
prevent another terrorist attack. The important point is that interests themselves are 
discursively constructed and reflect other discourses and narratives of national identity, 
threat, values, relationships, and the like. 
A comparative analysis of the core narratives of the war on terrorism
65
 and the 
main administration documents relating to the formulation and defense of the torture 
policy
66
 clearly demonstrates how the language and narratives fed into the logic and 
parameters of the policy itself. For example, one of the administration‟s most important 
rhetorical moves was to construct the terrorist attacks as „acts of war,‟ thereby invoking 
the nation‟s right to „justified self-defense‟ based on international law. President Bush 
said that „There has been an act of war declared upon America‟, while Under Secretary of 
State Marc Grossman stated that „we believe the United States was attacked on the 11th 
of September and that we have a right of self-defense in this regard.‟67 This public 
discursive construction of the state of conflict – that the terrorist attacks constituted a 
state of war – immediately found its way into the key documents of the torture policy. 
The President‟s Military Order of November 13, 2001 for example, which denied 
captured al Qaeda and Taliban fighters protection under the Geneva Conventions stated: 
„International terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks… on a 
scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States 
Armed Forces.‟68 Similarly, legal advice from the Attorney General‟s office affirmed: 
 
As we have made clear in other opinions involving the war against al Qaeda, the nation’s 
right to self-defense has been triggered by the events of September 11. If a government 
defendant were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner that might 
arguably violate Section 2340A, he would be doing so in order to prevent further attacks on 
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the United States by the al Qaeda terrorist network. In that case, we believe that he could 
argue that his actions were justified by the Executive branch‟s constitutional authority to 
protect the nation from attack. This national and international version of the right to self-
defense could supplement and bolster the government defendant‟s individual right.69 
 
In these texts we can observe a direct link drawn between the rhetoric of the terrorist 
attacks as acts of war, and the justification for employing illegal torture against „enemy 
combatants‟; it is a clear case of the discourse influencing the policy formulation process. 
 Another narrative central to the war on terrorism is the notion that both the 
terrorist threat and the kind of war they have initiated are „new‟ and unprecedented, and 
that consequently, a „new paradigm‟ is required to successfully defeat them (one that may 
involve jettisoning „old‟ restrictions). In large part, this is a reflexive discursive strategy 
designed to overcome the inherent contradiction involved in declaring a „war‟ (and 
invoking national self-defense on the basis of international law) whilst simultaneously 
denying the applicability of the laws of war to captured fighters. The rhetorical solution is 
to declare that it is a „new kind of war‟ fought not by recognized soldiers but by „enemy 
combatants.‟ For example, Bush frequently stated that the war against terrorism was „a 
different kind of war that requires a different type of approach and different type of 
mentality‟; he added, „All of us in government are having to adjust our way of thinking 
about the new war.‟70 Similarly, John Ashcroft argued that the unprecedented threat 
posed by terrorism required „new laws against America‟s enemies.‟71 This language is 
deliberately employed to stress the unique circumstances of the war against terror; in 
such an unprecedented situation, it can easily be argued that the „old‟ rules no longer 
apply. 
 This public language and the thinking it engendered similarly found its way into 
the policy process on coercive interrogations. A memorandum to the cabinet on the 
treatment of prisoners in the Afghan theatre for example, stated: „[T]he war against 
terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups with broad, international reach 
commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the direct support of 
states. Our Nation recognizes that this new paradigm – ushered in not by us, but by 
terrorists – requires new thinking in the law of war…‟72 This language directly echoed the 
administration‟s public rhetoric and set the discursive foundation for the policies that 
were to follow. In a memorandum for Alberto Gonzales, Assistant Attorney General Jay 
Bybee stated: 
 
As you have said, the war against terrorism is a new kind of war. It is not the traditional 
clash between nations adhering to the laws of war that formed the backdrop for GPW 
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[Geneva Convention III on the Treatment of Prisoners of War]. The nature of the new war 
places a high premium on other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information 
from captured terrorists... In my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva‟s 
strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its 
provisions….73 
 
Similarly, in the report of a special working group on the legal and operation implications 
of detainee interrogations, it was suggested that: 
 
Due to the unique nature of the war on terrorism in which the enemy covertly attacks 
innocent civilian populations without warning, and further due to the critical nature of the 
information believed to be known by certain of the al-Qaida and Taliban detainees regarding 
future terrorist attacks, it may be appropriate for the appropriate approval authority to 
authorize as a military necessity the interrogation of such unlawful combatants in a manner 
beyond that which may be applied to a prisoner of war who is subject to the protections of 
the Geneva Conventions.
74
 
 
In these texts, the logic and purpose of the reflexive language of the „new‟ and „different‟ 
war is clearly evident: because it is a fundamentally „new‟ kind of conflict, a „new 
paradigm‟ applies in which the previous limitations are rendered „obsolete‟ and „quaint‟, 
and interrogation may go beyond the protections of the Geneva Conventions. It is the 
logic of the discourse that drives the formation of the torture policy, rather than reasoned 
debate and consideration. This is in large part why the opposition to the policy from with 
the administration and the military was largely ignored and discounted. 
 Another narrative that was crucial for structuring the torture policy was the 
discursive construction of a massive and ubiquitous terrorist threat. Although 
understandable in the aftermath of the devastating September 11, 2001 attacks, the public 
language regarding the ongoing danger of terrorism was nonetheless hyperbolic in the 
extreme. For example, according to the administration, terrorism posed not just a threat of 
sudden violent death, but a „threat to civilization‟, a „threat to the very essence of what 
you do‟,75 a „threat to our way of life‟,76 and a threat to „the peace of the world‟.77 The 
Spokesman Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, Cofer Black, went even further: „The 
threat of international terrorism knows no boundaries.‟78 Administration officials also 
suggested that the threat of terrorism was supremely catastrophic. Dick Cheney stated: 
„The attack on our country forced us to come to grips with the possibility that the next 
time terrorists strike, they may well … direct chemical agents or diseases at our 
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population, or attempt to detonate a nuclear weapon in one of our cities.‟ He went on 
normalize the threat: „[N]o rational person can doubt that terrorists would use such 
weapons of mass murder the moment they are able to do so.‟79 Administration officials 
then went to great lengths to explain how the same terrorists (who are apparently eager to 
use weapons of mass destruction) are also highly sophisticated, cunning, and extremely 
dangerous: „The highly coordinated attacks of September 11 make it clear that terrorism 
is the activity of expertly organized, highly coordinated and well financed organizations 
and networks‟.80 Moreover, officials argued that this was not a tiny group of dissidents. 
Instead , the president warned: „Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods 
of murder, often supported by outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like 
ticking time bombs, set to go off without warning‟.81  
 The language of the national emergency engendered by the attacks, and the ever-
present and potentially catastrophic danger posed by terrorists, entered the torture policy 
debate immediately. For example, the threat of further terrorist attacks is referred to in the 
Military Order of November 13, 2001, primarily as a means of establishing that a 
„supreme emergency‟ is in effect:  
 
Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international terrorism possess both the 
capability and the intention to undertake further terrorist attacks against the United States 
that, if not detected and prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive 
destruction of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the United 
States Government. […] Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths, 
injuries, and property destruction that would result from potential acts of terrorism against 
the United States, and the probability that such acts will occur, I have determined that an 
extraordinary emergency exists for national defence purposes…82 
 
Similarly, in a direct echo of both the purported threat of weapons of mass destruction 
and the so-called „ticking time bomb‟ theory, and as a means of pre-emptively 
legitimizing the use of coercive interrogation, the Attorney General‟s office stated: 
 
…al Qaeda has other sleeper cells within the United States that may be planning similar 
attacks. Indeed, al Qaeda plans apparently include efforts to develop and deploy chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Under these circumstances, a detainee 
may possess information that could enable the United States to prevent attacks that 
potentially could equal or surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any 
harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance compared to the 
harm avoided by preventing such an attack, which could take hundreds or thousands of 
lives.
83
 
 
Importantly, this text reveals how the logic of the constructed terrorist threat determines 
the moral calculations at the heart of the torture policy: based on the popular „ticking 
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bomb‟ myth84 in which a terrorist has been captured after planting a bomb in a secret 
location, it is deemed morally expedient to torture the suspect in order to prevent an even 
greater evil from occurring.  
In short, the evidence strongly suggests that the discourse of the war on terrorism 
was not simply an objective or neutral debate about policy options and interests. Rather, 
it functioned to structure the institutional deliberations and content of the policies 
themselves, establishing the core interests, knowledge, and possibilities for action. The 
broader discourse of American counter-terrorism therefore, must be considered an 
important factor in the overall explanation for the torture and abuses in Iraq and the wider 
war on terrorism.  
 
The Social Construction of a Torture Society 
 
Political discourses do a great deal more than simply set the foundations and limits of 
policy formulation within government. They also function to create the necessary 
political legitimacy and social consensus required to properly enact those policies; they 
help to construct a new kind of social reality. In this instance, in order to enact the 
agreed-upon torture policy, administration officials had to deconstruct existing social 
reality with its conventional morality prohibiting torture, and replace it with a new 
„torture-sustaining‟ reality based upon a set of new morality-defining narratives. As 
Crelinsten puts it: „to enable torture to be practiced systematically and routinely, not only 
do torturers have to be trained and prepared, but wider elements of society must also be 
prepared and, in a sense, trained to accept that such things go on.‟85 The process of reality 
construction involves producing a series of powerful narratives that are then endlessly 
reproduced across every sector of society until they become widely accepted as legitimate 
„knowledge‟. In the case of a torture-sustaining reality, two main kinds of narratives are 
required: first, a powerful, threatening enemy must be constructed in order to justify the 
use of extraordinary measures against them; and second, the enemy must be dehumanized 
to render them deserving of their fate. I argue that this kind of social preparation or 
training is exactly what has taken place in the war on terrorism: an exceedingly powerful 
discourse about evil, inhuman terrorists and the catastrophic threat they represent has 
come to dominate American society in unprecedented ways. Consequently, members of 
the American public and the armed forces have come to accept the necessity and morality 
of torturing and abusing terrorist suspects.  
The public discourse of the war on terrorism is made up of a number of core 
narratives, including: the 9/11 attacks were an „act of war‟ similar to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor (rather than a criminal act, for example); the terrorist threat was new and 
unprecedented, global in scope, and potentially catastrophic to America and the civilized 
world; the terrorists were ruthless, evil, and inhuman enemies, while Americans were 
good, peace-loving, heroic, and united; and the „war on terrorism‟ was a quintessential 
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„good war‟ (in the same way that World War II and the cold war were) designed to bring 
the perpetrators to justice and make the world safe.
86
 These narratives were established 
across American politics and society and consequently within the American military, 
through their daily repetition,
87
 their relatively unmediated transmission to the public via 
the mainstream media,
88
 and their amplification through other social institutions. Recent 
studies show how the core narratives of the war on terrorism have been reproduced 
culturally across virtually every aspect of society: churches, religious broadcasting, 
teaching in schools and universities, popular fiction and non-fiction, children‟s books, 
television entertainment, newspapers, movies, documentaries, websites, think-tanks, 
popular music, computer games, cartoons, comic books, and a great many other 
discursive processes, have all replayed and reproduced the core narratives in popular 
form.
89
 It is important to note that the discourse of the war on terrorism was not 
necessarily new and did not arise solely in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001; 
rather, it drew upon a deeply embedded set of narratives about terrorism that had been 
popularized since the 1980s.
90
 
 In addition to the cultural dimension, the central narratives of the war on terrorism 
were reproduced across the political sphere when they were institutionalized and 
discursively embedded in: new legislation like the Patriot Act; new institutions like the 
Department of Homeland Security; reforms to the police, the security services, the Coast 
Guard, the immigration authorities, the prison service, the emergency services, and 
others; and vast numbers of departmental reports, strategy documents, internal memos, 
letters, and standard operating procedures across a multitude of government bodies. The 
narratives have been given further symbolic expression through anti-terrorism measures 
across virtually all aspects of social life, including the ubiquitous security checks on 
public transport, public gatherings, and access to government buildings, as well as new 
banking regulations, immigration procedures, public physical barriers, public readiness 
and information gathering programs, and daily terrorist threat warnings. Such practices 
function to underline the „reality‟ of the terrorist threat. Lastly, the central narratives were 
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reinforced by a series of highly publicized actions by the administration in the initial 
stages of the new war. For example, during Operation Enduring Freedom, Donald 
Rumsfeld openly stated that he would prefer it if Taliban and al Qaeda fighters were 
killed rather than be allowed to surrender; the Special Forces operating in Afghanistan 
were then given authority to kill on sight. Combined with the Military Order of 
November 13, 2001 in which combatants in Afghanistan were denied protection under 
the Geneva Conventions, these actions sent a powerful message to troops in the field (and 
the wider public at home) about how the lives of the enemy should be regarded. The 
American government also arrested thousands of suspects after September 11, 2001, 
denying them even the most basic of civil and legal rights, which sent another powerful 
discursive message. 
In other words, endlessly reproduced across all aspects of American society, the 
core narratives of the war on terrorism, particularly those regarding the terrible threat 
posed by terrorists and their evil, inhuman nature, functioned to create a new social 
reality in which a particular group of people – terrorists and terrorist suspects and 
sympathizers – were removed from the orbit of conventional reality.91 Evidence that this 
new torture-sustaining reality took hold thereby facilitating the abuses seen in the torture 
scandal can be found first and foremost in public attitudes towards torture. Polls have 
consistently found that a significant proportion of Americans agree that torturing terrorist 
suspects is justified on rare occasions.
92
 There is no reason to think that military or 
intelligence personnel held different views. We might also infer public attitudes from the 
popularity of television shows like Fox‟s 24, where torture is constantly justified and 
routinely practiced as a necessary counter-terrorism tool,
93
 from the absence of public 
concern or outrage at the public evidence of abuse mentioned earlier, and from the 
ongoing and very serious public debate by academics, officials, and journalists about the 
necessity and ethics of torture.
94
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I want to argue that it is also possible to demonstrate how the public discourse – 
in particular, narratives regarding the threat of terrorists, and the inherently evil, barbaric, 
and inhuman terrorist „other‟ – are implicated in the practice of torture through an 
examination of some specific instances of abuse, namely the torture revealed in 
photographs from Abu Ghraib
95
 and Guantánamo Bay. The images from these notorious 
cases reveal the myriad of ways in which the public discourse about terrorists was 
translated by individual soldiers into specific instances of abusive behavior. For example, 
the extreme forms of shackling seen in the images of the initial Guantánamo Bay 
prisoners (in some cases, bound and shackled to gurneys, detainees were wheeled to 
interrogations; in others they were tightly shackled, blindfolded, and muzzled) were 
officially justified on the grounds that these were such dangerous individuals that they 
had to be restrained in this fashion for the safety of those guarding them. General Richard 
E. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested that they were such a threat 
because given half a chance, they „would gnaw through hydraulic lines in the back of a 
C-17 to bring it down.‟96 Donald Rumsfeld said on a visit to Guantánamo that the 
prisoners there were „among the most dangerous, best-trained, vicious killers on the face 
of the earth.‟97 In effect, the ubiquitous public narrative of highly trained, expertly 
organized, and fanatical super-terrorists was translated directly into abusive 
transportation and prisoner management practices. The fear generated by the discourse of 
the dangerous terrorist „other‟ was thus discursively reflected in the prisoner control 
practices and the attitudes of the guards towards terrorist suspects. 
 Similarly, the public discourse by senior administration officials in which 
terrorists were frequently described as the „faceless enemies of human dignity‟98 was 
reflected in the institutional practice of putting hoods on prisoners or making them wear 
blackened goggles, masks, and ear covers during transit, thereby rendering them literally 
as well as figuratively „faceless‟. In the Abu Ghraib abuse photographs the victims are 
hooded even though there was no practical need for them given that they were in custody. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the hooding was both a deliberate means of de-
humanization to facilitate the subsequent abuse and a subconscious attempt to confirm 
them as „faceless‟ enemies. As the Milgram experiment and the real-world experience of 
counter-terrorism in Northern Ireland clearly demonstrated, interrogators find it far easier 
to inflict pain on their subjects when their facial expressions are obscured. In any case, 
these images reveal that the social and political construction of the „faceless‟ enemy other 
was more than simply political rhetoric; rather, it actually helped to co-constitute the 
widespread abuses of the counter-terrorist campaign. 
 Senior administration officials also frequently referred to terrorists as „animals‟ 
and „barbarians‟ who were outside the realm of civilized society. For example, America‟s 
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ambassador to Japan stated that the September 11, 2001 attacks were „an attack not just 
on the United States but on enlightened, civilized societies everywhere. It was a strike 
against those values that separate us from animals – compassion, tolerance, mercy.‟99 
This language suggested that terrorists were both animals and barbarian savages. 
President Bush reaffirmed this formulation when he stated that: „By their cruelty, the 
terrorists have chosen to live on the hunted margin of mankind. By their hatred, they have 
divorced themselves from the values that define civilization itself.‟100 In effect, this 
language placed terrorists outside of the civilized community, on the „hunted margins of 
mankind‟ and functioned to essentialize them as „an evil and inhuman group of men‟.101 
Effectively, it transformed them into sub-human savages and animals that needed to be 
hunted down and smoked out of their caves. Apparently, Ivan Frederick‟s favourite 
description of the prisoners was „animals‟.102 Employing the same language as Bush and 
Rumsfeld, Frederick then had no compunction against treating them as „animals‟. The 
most visually powerful expression of this discursive rendering is the photograph of 
Lynndie England holding a prisoner on a leash. Disturbingly reminiscent of colonial era 
photographs of African slaves tied by the neck,
103
 this image represents the ultimate 
realization of the discursive creation of the terrorist „savage‟ or „animal‟. Similarly, the 
image of the „savage‟ terrorist being confronted by a savaging dog is another discursive 
re-enactment of the public discourse: hunting dogs stalk the terrorist prey; the trained 
wild animal is employed to subdue the terrorist beast. 
 A final narrative relevant here is the notion of the terrorist enemy as a kind of 
disease or sickness. Colin Powell frequently referred to „the scourge of terrorism‟.104 This 
medical metaphor associates terrorists with filth and decay. It was restated even more 
explicitly by Rumsfeld: „We share the belief that terrorism is a cancer on the human 
condition‟.105 Bush in turn, spoke of the danger to the body politic posed by „terrorist 
parasites who threaten their countries and our own‟.106 In these constructions, the 
terrorists are re-made as dangerous organisms that make their host ill; they hide 
interiorly, drawing on the lifeblood of their unsuspecting hosts and spreading poison. It is 
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this image of the filthy, disease-ridden savage that perhaps subconsciously inspired the 
photograph of the prisoner smeared with what appears to be dirt or excrement.  
 In the end, I am suggesting that the virulent de-humanization of the terrorist 
„other‟ by the political elite (and the endless reproduction of such narratives across 
society) led directly to the literal attempt to de-individuate and de-personalize all 
terrorists – as well as the suspension of individual empathy and social inhibitions against 
wanton cruelty. The photographs of prisoners in huge piles of bodies, a mass of 
indistinguishable naked body parts and heads hooded to obscure individual faces, was the 
ultimate realization of this discourse. For a moment in time, the sub-human „terrorists‟ 
were discursively remade as a squirming mass of parasites or cancerous cells; they ceased 
to be individuals and their humanity dissolved. Disturbingly, the photographs of prisoners 
piled on top of each other also mirrored the well-known images of piles of naked corpses 
in the concentration camps during World War II; the Holocaust too, was in part the result 
of a discourse that defined the enemy „other‟ as inhuman „animals‟ and „parasites‟.107  
In short, the abuse photographs represent more than simply the careless 
recordings of a few sadistic or psychologically ill individuals; in an important sense, they 
were the logical outcome of a powerful public and private discourse that systematically 
de-humanized, de-personalized, and demonized the enemy „other‟. Within the confines of 
this language, the resulting torture and abuse was more than unsurprising; it was highly 
predictable. It became normalized within the moral logic of the language and practice of 
the war on terrorism. Apart from the confidence with which the Abu Ghraib abusers 
conducted themselves – giving the thumbs up to the camera, posing naked bodies in the 
general corridor with other activities continuing on behind them – the abuse was so 
widely known and accepted that one of the pictures was reportedly used as a screen saver 
on a computer in the interrogation room.
108
 As Crelinsten summarises it, the causes of 
torture are found in „the processes that permit the construction of a separate reality‟,109 
such as the creation of evil, inhuman, deadly enemies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the US government has distanced itself from the earlier documents of the 
torture policy and taken concrete steps to try and curb the use of torture by serving 
personnel, we still need to explain how torture became so widespread for the first four 
years of the war on terrorism,
110
 particularly given the legal prohibitions on torture in 
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American law and its human rights-based political culture. I have argued that 
explanations for torture lie in a combination of historical, social-psychological, and 
discursive factors, not least the construction and maintenance of a new torture-sustaining 
reality founded on a set of widely disseminated and continuously reproduced narratives. 
There are both ontological and political-normative implications to drawn from this study. 
Ontologically, the findings presented here suggest that we need to pay more attention to 
public political language and the way it is employed to justify projects of large-scale 
violence and set the parameters of public debate, and the way it structures and limits 
policy options. Analytical approaches which focus solely on interests or institutional and 
material factors are insufficient for explaining the emergence and persistence of complex 
political phenomena like torture. 
 From a political-normative perspective, the practice of torture by America has 
important implications for the fragile international human rights regime. Regardless of 
how „real‟ America‟s commitment to the promotion of human rights is thought to be,111 
the fact is that great powers play a crucial role in norm-setting and norm-upholding in 
international relations and their public behaviour legitimates the behaviour of others 
within the international system. The conspicuous denial of human rights to torture 
victims and prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, as well as the suspension of the Geneva 
Conventions and the major political and military support for regimes with poor human 
rights records, have sent a powerful message to other states in the system that claims of 
national security concerns can be used to abandon any commitment to human rights. In 
the process, many of the instruments and institutions of international human rights law, 
painstakingly constructed over the past few decades, may have been seriously 
undermined. Few now disagree that globally, human rights have been undermined by 
American actions in the war on terrorism.
112
  
Related to this, the continued expression and reproduction of a public discourse 
that demonises and dehumanizes the terrorist „other‟, suggests that torture and abuse will 
probably continue to occur, even if it moves further underground; as long as the public 
(and politicians) are encouraged to see terrorist suspects as less than human and 
essentially evil, the torture-supporting reality will remain and abuses will most likely 
occur. Normatively, this suggests that there is a pressing need to oppose and deconstruct 
the language and narratives of the war on terrorism. An important part of this must 
involve publicizing the extensive research that demonstrates that „terrorists‟ are not 
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inherently „evil‟, or inhuman, or even pathological,113 and that historically, there are more 
effective forms of counter-terrorism based on criminal justice-based initiatives combined 
with social and political reform and dialogue.  
More specifically, it must involve affirming why torture is never acceptable under 
any circumstances, even as a limited warrant for extreme situations. There are a great 
many powerful arguments to make in support of an absolute prohibition on torture: by 
nature torture is a unique kind of wrong – a form of rape that perverts human 
relationships and agency – that cannot be morally justified under any circumstances;114 
torture violates the principle of non-combatant immunity, which is the same reason why 
terrorism is morally wrong;
115
 torture leaves permanent damage to both the tortured
116
 
and the torturer,
117
 and thus, is morally indefensible; the ticking bomb scenario is a highly 
flawed thought experiment with virtually no real-world relevance;
118
 torture is a very 
poor tool of intelligence-gathering and can even be counter-productive;
119
 sociologically 
and historically, exceptions to the prohibition on torture have always led to widespread 
use in non-exceptional cases and have undermined the moral community and the respect 
for human rights more generally;
120
 and its legal adoption by a democratic society would 
entail moral practices that are incompatible with liberal norms and rights, such as torture-
training for interrogators and doctors, medical support for torture sessions, research and 
development in non-lethal torture, and the manufacture of torture equipment and torture 
facilities, for example. 
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